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ABSTRACT: The legal system undergoes again a deep process of transformation that may be 
attributed to the emergence of the “society of networks”. The earlier transformations that took place 
in the “society of organisations” were centred around the organisation as a kind of “big individual” 
that was and still is able to aggregate and manage long chains of actions as opposed to the individual 
subject whose action was rule oriented and followed established patterns of experience. The “society 
of organisations” was characterised by the rise of all kinds of social norms (standards), organised 
generation of knowledge, and practices of “balancing” that the multiplication of long chains of action 
have made necessary. The “society of networks” leads to more complex processes of knowledge 
generation and tends to create new “quasi-subjects” that follow mobile project-like patterns of 
cooperation. They are focused on “high knowledge” that is involved in permanent processes of self- 
-transformation. The emergence of “data driven technologies” that do not follow stable trajectories is 
paradigmatic. It is a challenge for the legal system if what the new loosely aggregated quasi-subjects 
of the “society of networks” do is “surfing fluid reality” (Bahrami/Evans). This evolution finds its 
repercussion in new challenges for the regulatory state and also for contracting practices in private 
law. “Serial law” might be a new paradigm of law that “reads” processes of change in real time and 
experiments with forms of coordination that refer to learning processes.
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PRELIMINARY REMARkS: FROM THE RULE OF LAW TO “SERIAL LAW”?
The hierarchical, top-down perspective on law is still the dominant 
one (primarily in continental legal systems – given that there are some 
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peculiarities in Anglo-American law): This principle finds its repercussion 
in public law in the doctrine of the “delegation” of rule-making power by 
parliament to administrative agencies or the assumption that the law is 
“applied” to cases, but that cases do not make law. Because this doctrine is 
untenable in practice the principle is mitigated by the acknowledgment of 
“judge-made law” or the recognition of “broad” parliamentary delegations 
or “quasi” – legal rules (administrative norms that are treated as legal norms 
to a certain extent). At the same time there is a plethora of legal delegations 
that seem to fulfil the requirements of the delegation doctrine (at least 
in the formal sense) without really allowing for the formation of rational 
expectations of citizens or firms. One should go one step further and give 
up the delegation doctrine for the practice of decision-making in conditions 
of complexity, i. e. control ex ante should be superseded by a new control 
project, to wit, control ex post. One could openly accept the law-making 
power of administration or of private organisations i. e. “serial law”, which is 
generated from a “series” of experimental search processes in conditions of 
uncertainty. One could, perhaps, transcend the limits of systems theory, which 
still presupposes the stable functions of societal systems of communication, 
i. e. for the legal system: the counterfactual stabilisation of (behavioural) 
expectations (Luhmann 1993). One could hope for further inspiration from 
a “media theory” of law (Vesting 2011-2015 – English translation to appear).
Scott Lash (1999: 265) takes the view that the media, the culture of the 
media, bring to the fore late-modern forms of a rupture with representation, 
the clear distinction of rule and exception, norm and facticity, the universal 
and the particular, inside and outside (e.g. of organisations and markets). 
The media (scripture, book, films, television, press, computer networks) 
increasingly structure the heterarchical processes of self-organisation of the 
law and thereby undermine clear conceptual distinctions. The “media” in 
this sense are not primarily characterised by “the physicality of a specific 
medium”, the book (Vesting 2013), the computer network (Hansen 2004: 23; 
Vesting 2015; Krauss 2008: 7, 35), but by the modes of (re-)configurations 
of communications that are “mediated” by the media in the technical sense, 
e.g. for computer networks the extreme “plasticity” of the figures and forms 
of digitisation, “the processural realization of information in time... as a 
traditional image ... only for contingent reasons” (Hansen 2004: 9) – the 
digital structure allows for the permanent transformation on the basis of an 
infinite combinatorics of fragments – it needs a learning “algorithmic” order 
that can use the possibility in order to search for the potential stabilization 
of patterns, of productive “nodes” of interrelationships within informational 
processes in real time and can test their practical viability. This finds its 
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repercussion in the legal system for example in the emergence of “contextual” 
contracting, which does no longer presuppose the stability of expectations 
ex ante because this would undermine the functionality of law in conditions 
of high complexity (Sabel & Zeitlin 2004; Sabel & Simon 2012; Jennejohn 
2008; 2010).
This needs a broader comment. One might start from a perspective 
on J. L. Nancy’s (1996) theoretical reflections on the “singular” (“singulier”) 
that or who can no longer be subsumed as the “particular” (which is already 
characterised by universality or a general “trait”, as an “example) under the 
general/universal. This finds its political repercussion in the fact that the 
representative institutions (parliament, political parties, trade unions etc.) 
are increasingly facing the resistance of the particular, which escapes from 
the generalisation of interests, of political strategies, of legal standardisation. 
Whether this leads into a self-destructive aporia or just aesthetic resistance 
of versions of protest without political demands addressed to institutions 
is not clear (Ladeur 2015: 97). This can be left open, however, these are 
phenomena of a crisis, which implies that the “singular” cannot just be 
the starting point for generalisation, for the formulation of stable universal 
norms.
According to Scott Lash (1999: 267) the combination between 
“singulars” is exactly what the media are up to. E. Domenach (2006: 
90) takes a similar view when she ventures the assumption (following St. 
Cavell) that the media (literature, films) remind us that we have to look at 
specific “singular” works in order to discover and experiment with new 
possibilities, which we would not see if we were already involved in the 
search for understanding the universal. What is at stake are the “poietic 
possibilities”, the never ending “flow of analogies” (D. Hofstadter/E. Sander 
2013) that still need stop rules if we do not want to risk complete chaos. 
Otherwise there could not be any “order from chaos” (cf. Atlan 1979). 
St. Cavell (1989: 77) has aptly formulated what the new challenge (after 
the end of the universality and generality of order) is; it is the paradox of 
“finding as founding” (no emphasis in the original). A foundation is found, 
not founded! This means that there is an entanglement of hierarchies, of 
the general and the singular, of persons and things, that allows only for the 
experimentation with forms and patterns that have no preliminary stability. 
In a legal perspective this would mean that we have to reckon with new 
quasi-subjects, nodes within networks of relationships, which introduce 
new aggregation of action potential which go beyond the organisation 
(and the individual subject). This is why one may talk about a “society of 
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networks” Of course, what I have in mind is not Nancy’s reference to the 
“singular” (“singulier”), which in my view, remains enclosed in an aesthetic 
paradox, although it might be regarded as an intellectual “instigation” to 
make use of the heterarchy of interrelationships between things, persons, 
possibilities, below the level of stable concepts in order to grasp the “unrest” 
that comes to the fore in the legal system and which cannot be tackled either 
upon the basis of a classical normativity of rules (and discursive rationality of 
argumentation) or as a systems theoretical approach to the law as a system of 
communication whose touch upon the facticity “outside” is always filtered 
by a predetermined eigenrationality (Luhmann 1993) – that determines both 
what it “sees” and how it “sees”: programmes (norms) may change, but the 
law’s function itself remains the same. This is dubious because the facticity 
itself has become so disruptive that the dependence of the law on facts and 
social conventions, the observation of the clusters and patterns within the 
facts is transformed. N. Luhmann (1971) has anticipated the possibility that a 
“cognitive rationality” might replace the rationality of the law. This is perhaps 
a one-sided look at an alternative to the presupposition of a stable function 
of the law. The law’s function itself may undergo a process of transformation 
in conditions of rapid changes in the knowledge basis of society. Such a 
dependence of the law on the stability of facts can go unnoticed for a long 
time, if the facticity itself changes only slowly and continuously1.
I will try to demonstrate the idea of a transformation of the legal 
system, of normativity, focusing on four domains which are under the 
pressure of the highly dynamic and disruptive development of technologies 
and knowledge: The emergence of global administrative law (“from above”) 
and the challenge of “high technology” for administrative law (“from 
above”). The development of communication structures on the Internet that 
undermine the hitherto established social norms on communication, and 
finally the evolution of new forms for the management of private contracts 
in the domain of “high knowledge” that reacts to the phenomena of extreme 
complexity in technology.
THE FUTURE FORMS OF CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A reflection on the future of domestic and global administrative 
law (Stewart 2006: 695, 705) may be helpful here: in both fields, a new 
generative dynamic momentum comes to the fore, which is due to the rise 
1 M. de Certeau (1990: 218) has taken the view that the “normative discourse” only “works” (“marche”), if it 
has been preceded by a historical “story” (“récit”), a text that “has articulated with something real and speaks 
in its name” (“articulé sur du réel et parlant en son nom”).
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of networks emerging beyond both classical liberal administrative law (“the 
society of individuals”) and its focus on the abstract person. This evolution 
demonstrates that administrative law can no longer be constructed with 
reference to classical patterns and their stabilisation by statute law. Meaning 
is no longer deposited in slowly evolving rules of experience nor in the 
legal text. It pre-supposes a dynamic modelling of a distributed domain 
of options and relations thereby invoking a multiplicity of perspectives in 
“real time” in an open context. Co-operation will not only occur in public- 
-private networks alone, but also in “inter-public” joint ventures that mobilise 
expertise beyond the limits of stable territorial competencies (Zaring 2005 
for transnational cooperation of agencies). The transnational dimension of 
administrative law is nothing but an expansion of the multi-layered spatial 
relationships that emerge at domestic level. The discretion of administrative 
decision-makers which finds its legitimation in the increasing importance of 
specialised knowledge that has to be generated within complex procedures 
and demands the use of adequate methods of control could be opened for the 
co-ordination of heterogeneous and polycentric knowledge bases of different 
countries and societies2, in the sense that, in transnational procedures, the 
aggregation and integration of global social norms and knowledge might be 
regarded as a new meta-rule also for the judicial control of administrative 
discretion. Considering the dynamic nature of the administration both in, and 
of networks, more evaluation (Stichweh 2004: 147, 155) ex post and more 
indirect rule-making will be necessary: “steering” administrative practice ex 
ante by statutes or by the “application” of informal rules of experience will 
not be sufficient. The new knowledge base of the “society of networks” will 
allow for more self-organised rules and patterns, while, at the same time, the 
decreasing relevance of stable norms in both senses should lead to a focus 
on procedural norms which are designed with regard to the generation of 
new knowledge that will be useful for the evaluation ex post.
We are still in the process of experimentation, which will generate new 
forms of action, new procedures, new types of co-ordination between public 
and private actors. It may well be the case that the role of the judiciary in 
this new evolutionary process will be negligible, not to mention codification 
by the legislator. What should be conceivable is a new type of co-operation 
between domestic agencies and the legislator, with the prospect of coupling 
transnational procedures of decision-making and domestic legitimation and 
accountability of decision-makers (cf. generally Dyzenhaus 2008). New 
2 For the re-emergence of the methodological problems of a distinction between “law and non-law” cf. 
Zumbansen (2012).
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elements of an intertwinement of domestic and transnational law might be 
developing.
DATA DRIVEN TECHNOLOGIES AND THE MODEL OF “EVOLUTIVE NETWORkS”
The regulation of data-driven technologies can itself only follow a 
model of “evolutive networks” (M. Amstutz), i. e. under the transformed 
conditions of uncertainty stable goals for the regulatory process can only 
be formulated to a limited extent. Such a strategy is useful only insofar as 
certain risks can be analysed and described beforehand – and these are the 
risks of the past. This is why first of all the internal risk management of firms 
should be strengthened (Reiling 2016).
During the last financial crisis the internal institutions of the risk 
management of banks has been weakened by a “philosophy” that has 
favoured the “makers” at the expense of the staff that were responsible for 
the risk management. The latter have been devaluated as the “worriers” as 
opposed to the “warriors” who run the risk and meet the challenge of the 
markets. This has also led to a spread of salaries in favour of the former and 
to the detriment of risk managers. In the regulation of financial markets it 
would be crucial to focus more on avoiding a clustering of the risks that might 
accumulate in a way that would block the potential of self-organisation of the 
market. However, concrete patterns of such a regulatory policy cannot be 
designed in advance but only in real time by way of continuous observation 
of markets and a conception of an “evolutive regulation” upon the basis of 
a basic ex ante regulation that is focused on the access to the knowledge 
needed for such a mobile strategy whereas the core element of regulation 
should consist in the observation of risk indicators ex post. This could be the 
new heuristic for an appropriate regulatory strategy.
Clustering would then be regarded as a kind of “network failure” that 
should be an important frame of reference for risk regulation in the “society 
of networks”: the network collapses and is no longer able to mobilise and 
make use of its potential for self-organisation and flexible self-transformation 
in order to meet the challenge of crises. The same could be assumed for the 
new technologies that can be called “data driven”, as well, i. e. technologies 
in whose development no linear trajectory can be identified.
It will be important to regard the volatility of the process that is to be 
regulated not only as a problem but also as a potential for a flexible smart 
regulation: regulation ex ante can easily fail under conditions of complexity, 
although it is not only the regulation of financial markets but also that of 
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complex technologies such as nanotechnology or genetic engineering 
generate an abundance of data that could also be read by a public regulatory 
strategy3. For example, nanotechnology allows for the use of micro particles 
that that can be combined to other nanosubstances or genetically-modified 
organisms as “biomarkers” that allow for the observation of the risks 
of clustering. This means that computerisation of technological design 
could also be used for a strategy of flexible regulation that is based upon 
evolutionary learning algorithms. The recent transformation of genetic 
engineering (CRISPR) towards a new informational paradigm demonstrates 
the new challenge of emerging technologies that are mainly “data driven”: 
genetic engineering has developed a technique of “reprogramming” plants 
(“genome editing”), a kind of computerisation, that cannot be treated as 
traditional genetic engineering (Camacho et al. 2014; Grossarth FAZ 2006, 
Nr. 83, 21). Whether it may be subsumed under the regulatory regime for 
genetic engineering is dubious. The problem has been exacerbated by a 
position recently taken by the European Commission (16/April/2016) not 
to regard this new technology as “genetic engineering” in the former sense 
but to opt for a new intense regulation of the risks of the new technology4. 
This will present a huge problem because of the extreme flexibility of the 
new technology that can no longer be clearly distinguished from methods of 
traditional plant breeding.
The monitoring of rapidly changing environments and the distribution 
of potentially hazardous substances in the environment may also be too 
complex for humans to design. A new strategy that would observe the 
changing landscape both of research and of technology could observe a 
close relationship between such an innovative strategy and the coming 
paradigm of the “Internet of things”: on the one hand, a “web of sensors” 
could communicate data that are collected from nature, on the other, 
the “web of nature” is modelled upon the basis of a new conception of 
information technology conception, and both “communicate” without a 
human interface.
Clearly, this does not mean that “older” regulatory models should be 
abolished altogether. There should be a combination of elements of all three 
paradigms: in as far as experience continues to be available, the traditional 
3 The limits of the traditional regulation of technology, i. e. to presuppose a linear development of a technology 
that follows a certain “trajectory” is demonstrated by the recent evolution of genetic engineering that has 
considerably changed and can no longer be referred to a stable “description”.
4 http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_round_up/2987595/new_gmos_are_not_gm_eu_folds_under_us_
pressure.html
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model should not be given up, the prospect of organisational generation of 
knowledge should be taken into consideration as well, and we still need a 
new approach for the emerging data driven technologies that can no longer 
be regulated according to the traditional paradigms – and this means before 
they are used in practice.
As far as technology is concerned we will face a new challenge once 
nanotechnology will play a more important role, which is only a question 
of time: this new technology – if one may still speak of one technology at 
all – will make the relationship between science and technology even more 
complex: nanotechnology will not just provoke a new process of reframing 
the relationship between science and technology, it will reverse the hitherto 
established hierarchy between both: technology no longer makes “use” of 
science – on the contrary, it is rather technology that changes nature and 
creates new versions of “objectivity” (Daston & Galiston 2010). This new 
disruptive transformation will no longer allow for ex ante evaluations of 
risks and of risk management. Risk assessment technologies will, on the 
one hand, have to be integrated into the new technological trajectories 
and follow their evolution. On the other hand, the rise of “smart systems” 
can be used for the generation of a huge amount of risk information by the 
systematic observation of technological “applications”. This new turn will 
demonstrate once more the importance of information technology and its 
ubiquitous presence in systems that generate artificial knowledge.
THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET
thE missing sociAl norms And how to gEnErAtE thEm
Another variant can be seen in the discussions about the limits of Internet 
communications. The web communities on the Internet tend to regard every 
legal barrier to Internet communications as an unacceptable interference 
in the fundamental rights of the individual. This, too, is a manifestation of 
the deterioration of a balance of legally protected interests moving to create 
“groupings” of interests (W. Benjamin). Against this background, which can 
only be summarily illustrated here, the development of Internet connections, 
from the perspective of both social theory and the law, must be seen as a 
challenge, as it rips right through the differentiated construction of both the 
public sphere and that of privacy, as well as of each one’s relationship with 
the other. Compared to this, the forms of communication typical to the new 
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media, such as blogs or social media posts, acquire a hybrid character5. 
In this context, this means that the factual, social and legal conditions of 
the differentiation of the relationship between the private and the public 
spheres are convulsed (Ladeur & Gostomzyk 2011: 710). In particular, 
individuals can communicate with large numbers of unknown participants 
electronically or, more precisely, non-orally and this derails the rules 
that govern the borderline between private and public issues. Electronic 
communications about “private” issues take place in what is in any case a 
potentially public manner, so that the participants in the communications 
no longer address one another privately and individually, but frequently also 
quite unintentionally can reach a large number of people, without the person 
generating the message always being able to control this, as was hitherto 
the case with the mass-media. It might even be said that mass-media forms 
can be reproduced within hybrid Internet communications (by professional 
bloggers), but there are also the ambiguous figures of communicating 
individuals who themselves suddenly become semi-media when they set 
out to achieve mass dissemination of their communications and surprisingly 
actually succeed in doing so.
In the past, the oral nature of communications used to set factual limits 
to the dissemination of the private individual’s messages, while the public 
media’s right to express themselves was limited by the law. On the other 
hand, examples can be used to show that 90-95 per cent of information 
that is of general interest at local level is produced by the traditional media, 
while the new media just compile it new ways and distribute it. That is why 
issues that are much more specialised are now reproduced. This leads to 
the bundling function of the classical media focused on the state and on 
the civic public realm losing out in significance (FCC 2011: 124). A report 
from the United States’ FCC calls this development “the great unbundling” 
(127). The professionalisation of reporting standards and the concomitant 
centralisation of knowledge rules also benefited the legal protection of third 
parties and enabled criteria to be developed for processing knowledge or 
maintaining or limiting non-knowledge or silence.
thE trAnsformAtion of intErnEt communicAtion
The Internet is changing the procedural rules of knowledge and 
non-knowledge fundamentally: communications now only appear to be 
disseminated horizontally, with no beginning and no end, to be brought into 
5 About the “superficiality” of blog communications, see A. Sullivan (2009: 103).
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being without any standards that could be used for evaluating the proficiency 
of the knowledge that they contain for the future (Herrenschmidt 2007). This 
also makes any legal control and monitoring of such standards more difficult 
– and not only factually. The most important battle fought by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) against the chilling effects of juridification is 
symptomatic of the absence of any concept of a “control project” for the 
Internet or of any overarching perspective6.
Knowledge is still connected to a distributed heterarchical network 
that does not appear to leave any space for stable rules of attribution, 
separation or responsibility to develop and be centralised. The attention 
paid to knowledge is generated virally or by being infected by matrices, for 
which there are no prior regularities and which allow no rules to develop to 
govern the social reflection of the limits of knowledge and non-knowledge 
(secrecy). This is logical, to the extent that, as B. Groys puts it, in many 
of the new forms of communication on the Internet (in this case referring 
to Google), “man no longer speaks in the traditional sense”. He becomes 
a “user” who “applies the various different linguistic contexts, topoi or 
terrains or makes new ones” (Groys 2012: 27). He lets “words appear or 
disappear in different contexts – in a completely silent and purely operative 
extra-or metalinguistic form of practice” (Groys 2012: 27). The flow of the 
process itself becomes the framework of reference of the “synaptic self” or 
of the “neuronal personality” (LeDoux 2003; Malabou 2004; 2005), which 
is disturbed by “censorship”, i.e. the external interruption of the process 
of relating. It might be thought that the fact that Germany’s “Pirate Party” 
has no political platform, together with, in particular the rising interest in 
“direct” democracy, is a manifestation of the viral character of the Internet 
itself and thus of the heterarchical “society of networks”. This corresponds 
to the emergence of a fleeting, oscillating subjectivity that is inherent to 
the immediate experience of fluctuating attention and refutes all forms of 
mediatisation, institutionalisation and representation of the aggregation of 
generalisable interests.
nEw institutions for thE “sociEty of nEtworks”
The development of the Internet marks a break with the rules and 
the regularities that changes social communications that find themselves 
on the borderline between the private and the public spheres. This also 
6 Even humiliating comments posted in the social media are defended against “chilling effects” attibuted to 
sanctions; cf. for example District Court, Central District of California v. 16.11.2009 – CV 08-03824 SVW 
(CWx).
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preferably calls for (complementary) new institutions of (alternative) conflict 
resolution that are attuned more to change and less to conservation (Ladeur 
& Gostomzyk 2011), so as to allow for “learning by monitoring” (Jennejohn 
2010). A practice of this kind can be observed in the “relational (incomplete) 
contracts” of hi-tech companies (Sabel & Zeitlin 2004: 388), in which 
conflicts are no longer soluble by external judges, but are more likely to be 
found in and submitted to modular procedural methods designed to enable 
the problem to be described and overcome in the context of a flow that 
goes beyond the traditional concepts of borderlines (Jennejohn 2010). This 
does not rule out the possibility of an external support, also from the state’s 
courts. But their role changes in the dynamic context of the Internet, with its 
focus on self-adjustment, in the sense of the primary task of underpinning 
the ability of Internet communications to organise themselves. The problem 
of the law in the Internet in general and the protection of personality rights 
in particular has its basis in the fact that the web has undermined the weight 
of social norms hat have structured communication in a most differentiated 
and subtle way.
The problems of data protection in the Internet are so manifold that 
not all can be raised in the context of this article. This is also the reason 
why they cannot be tackled by clear-cut rules to be imposed on the net in 
advance, from outside. The steering of data-communication is impossible. 
This complexity can, however, be tackled by a version of proceduralisation 
of the legal order of the self-organisation process which the Internet 
undergoes as the “network of networks”. The internal differentiation of the 
legal structure of the Internet may allow for the generation of new knowledge 
and its processing via specific institutions of the Internet.
A net-specific problématique of the implementation of legal controls 
consists in the discrepancy between the attention which the distinct item of 
data of the individual meets on the one hand, and the values of the processing 
and relationing of data through data mining, the construction of personality 
profiles (Turow & Tsui 2008), the observation of broad data-flows, and the 
operation of linking data by firms and by the state for reasons of security. 
The interest in the closure and disclosure of information are both legitimate.
thE nEcEssity to obsErvE thE collEctivE EffEcts of thE procEssing of dAtA flows
It would be much more helpful to change the paradigm of the 
conception of data protection 2.0 to a focus on networks, i.e. to have a 
closer look at the opportunities and risks of data processing in networks 
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and to adapt its legal structure which is still characterised by its origin in the 
offline world to the conditions of the media world (Grimmelmann 2009). 
The rapid proliferation and continuous linking of information in networks 
can no longer be adequately mirrored in the individual right to decide on the 
separate domains of action that are attributed to persons. This construction 
can no longer do justice to the hybridisation of legal constellations. For 
example: a firm can possibly generate a high information value by data- 
-mining, which does not correspond to the construction of an accumulation 
of infringement of individual rights to decide on the use of the data which are 
of no particular interest to the user himself or herself. A hybrid construction 
which is more adapted to the collective transsubjective component of the 
data in a network can bring a more flexible and adequate solution to this 
dilemma (see below).
A case for a reconceptualisation of data protection is the de- 
-anonymisation of IP-addresses by both private persons and the public 
security agencies. In this respect it should be taken into consideration that 
the Internet as the “network of networks” cannot be dissolved into a number 
of linear relationships of exchange between individuals – the precondition 
of the older regime of protection of privacy in telecommunications – but 
that the old telecommunication has been transformed into an online world 
with its own rationality of information processing und the generation of 
new information products which is based on the generation of collective 
and collateral effects between information. These transsubjective effects 
can no longer be attributed to individual “owners”. Examples of these new 
phenomena are eBay ratings7 and the ratings of professional achievements 
(teachers, professors, medical doctors etc.; cf. Verga 2007). The ubiquitous 
nature of the Internet and its new logic come to the fore when we take 
a look at the transformation of the relationship between different types of 
rights which have been developed and coordinated in the offline world and 
migrate into the Internet. It is inevitable that this entails a major effect of 
destabilisation that has to be compensated by a rebalancing.
thE sElf-orgAnisAtion of thE “dAtA-ownErs” vis-à-vis privAtE Actors following thE ExAmplE 
of “collEcting sociEtiEs” in thE protEction of intEllEctuAl propErty: A modEl for nEt 
friEndly lEgAl instrumEnts
A new “control regime” (White 2008: 245) which is fine-tuned to 
the functioning of the Internet and the processing of data and patterns of 
7 In the US eBay offers an electronic mediation procedure via “Square Trade”; http://pages.ebay.com/services/
buyandsell/disputeres.html
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combination could, for example, consist in the public and private funding 
of self-organised private institutions for the protection of data on the Internet 
following the model of collecting societies in intellectual property law and 
practice. Such a new type of association of users might act as an “information 
broker” in the sense of a representation of the hybrid public-private interests 
of the users that transcend their own limited privacy concerns and are 
focused on the transsubjective elements of data processing on the Internet. 
These associations could make contracts on the conditions of the use of 
data that are not of much concern for each individual. This approach could 
correspond to the new transborder effect, which is common for the Internet 
use of data inasmuch as it raises collective effects from mass transactions 
that hitherto did not have any relation except to a central agent (such as a 
broadcaster). This “information broker” might make contracts on payment for 
the use of Internet data or make contracts on the quality of the protection of 
privacy. This form might be a productive alternative to the bureaucratic form 
of data protection by the institution of a public officer for the protection of 
privacy (Datenschutzbeauftragter). This model could present the appropriate 
levels of flexibility and hybridisation (balancing individual and collective 
interests) which are required by the logic of the Internet, whereas traditional 
legal instruments and procedure are more based upon the expectation of the 
stability of rights and public goods.
A new control regime has to adapt to the volatility and ubiquity of 
Internet communication by flexible self-organisation of legal positions 
that are involved in a procedural mode of permanent self-transformation. 
It has to react to the fact that even identities are no longer stable but are 
“sampled” and open to transformation. One can even go so far as to assume 
that networks themselves become quasi-subjects in their own right.
thE “nEtwork contrAct” As A nEw pArAdigm of privAtE lAw for thE “sociAl mEdiA”
First of all, it should be recognised that, besides other legal arguments 
for the liability of social-media providers, primarily the relationship between 
users and social media is a contractual one. In the American literature, this 
type of contract is regarded as an “adhesion contract”8. In legal practice, 
this means that the contract has the legal value of a more or less one-sided 
submission to the contract because conditions are normally formulated by 
only one partner of the contract, i.e., the “provider”. The construction of 
8 Cf. the seminal article by F. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract 
(1943), Yale Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2731, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2731.
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a contractual relationship seems to be adequate because one partner, the 
provider, offers the possibility of using the communication services, whereas 
the other, the user, gives his or her consent to the use of the data that he 
or she places on his or her account for advertising strategies. This mutual 
consent brings about a relationship of reciprocity: the user can expect the 
conditions of use not to be changed arbitrarily. The provider lays open the 
conditions of use and the commercial use of the data for advertising, in 
particular. An exclusion of any forms of advertising is not a choice which 
is open to the users. The specific contractual relationship that is brought 
about in this constellation is characterised by the fact that a high number 
of similar “exchange” contracts are concluded at the same time, and that 
conditions of use are formulated by the provider. However, at the same time, 
there is a second level of inter-relationships among the users themselves, 
which is not just a multiplication of a standardised version of a contract, 
although, in this case, the relationships between the participants including 
the user – user-relationships – form a “triangular” contract. The consent of 
the user to make use of the data for advertising only makes sense in the 
event that the other users allow for this use, too. This constellation might 
allude to the recent construction of “network contracts” (Teubner 2011) – 
with a principled construction of this new type of contract, although Stefan 
Grundmann (2007: 757) is more prudent in this regard. The sense of such a 
construction could consist in the consequence that the triangular nature of 
the contract does not remain at the factual level but can lead to ideas about a 
specific “hybrid” institutional component. The relationship is a “hybrid” one 
in as much as it can be located beyond the level of the bilateral exchange 
contract, but below the level of a “company” (or, even less so, a corporate 
association). One has to bear in mind that this is not a normal case of a 
pre-determined setting of “general terms and conditions” which supplement 
the consent of the partners on the reciprocal rights and obligations, but of 
a one-sided competency of the provider to define the main duties of the 
user and to change them whenever he or she deems it appropriate (Terenzi 
2010). The differentiation of the informational scheme of Facebook’s sites 
mirrors, in a way, the “hybrid” character of the “regulatory” structure of the 
network: Facebook has, apart from the site on which the general terms and 
conditions are laid out9, a separate site on “governance”10, which contains 
rules of procedure on the change of rules, etc. This construction might look 
9 Cf. the seminal article by F. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract 
(1943), Yale Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2731, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2731.
10 www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance.
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promising, although, as a consequence, only those members that click on 
this site11 obtain the information on the procedures.
The trans-subjective (“hybrid”) component of the contract is to be seen 
in the fact that the purpose of the contract is not to be formulated clearly 
in advance. The relationships within the network are prone to continuous 
change, they evolve upon the basis of communication processes which, first 
of all, are freely formulated and are integrated into a vast open network of 
relationships that allow for a plethora of communicative options. It is only 
at a secondary step that the provider observes these inter-relationships and 
tries to design the possibility of “surfing” on this network with the modelling 
of a commercial type of interest.
Advertising in the “social media” does not follow the traditional 
patterns of addressing a mass public; instead, it is characterised by the 
observation and “appropriation” of specific communicative networks that 
are spontaneously generated by the users. These differentiated networks 
process personalised information on consumer interests that may be re- 
-coded by advertising firms. This is also the reason why the consent of the 
users for the re-processing of personalised profiles cannot be determined in 
detail ex ante.
This new constellation might fit into the new framework of “networks 
of contract” which might help develop new rules for the management of a 
hybrid “network interest” (G. Teubner) between exchange and collective 
interests. This “network interest” is emergent and heterarchical; at the end of 
the day, it can only be adopted for purposes of advertising if this is consented 
to by the users. The provider cannot just follow his or her own interest, 
but also has to support the processing of the networks of communications 
between the users by shaping an adequate institutional framework (cf. 
Grimmelmann 2010: 795). The relevance of the network of the inter-
relationships between the users and the openness of the experimental 
development of communicative patterns and, at the same time, the evolving 
possibilities of personalised advertising could be a sound basis for the re-
formulation and concretisation of the pre-conditions of “informed consent” 
in a dynamic environment.
11 A few years ago Facebook announced a change in the “terms of use” on the governance site and opened a 
voting procedure for the week of 1 June to 8 June 2012; however, only a tiny fraction of the users participated 
– far below the quota hás participated; cf. “Die Mitbestimmung ist rein virtuell”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 6 June 2012.
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CIVIL LAW AND CONTRACTING ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY PROjECTS
The phenomenon of self-organisation of legal relationships can also 
be observed in civil law where increasingly components of a contextual 
law that develop in “real time” come to the fore (Sabel & Zeitlin 2004; 
Sabel & Simon 2012) in contractual practice. In the domain of contracting 
on projects of high technology, or rather “high knowledge”, the forms 
of bargaining and contracting become more and more fluid because the 
projects are so complex that it is difficult to figure out beforehand what is 
at stake: for example, in the process of developing an innovative software 
several people co-operate without determining ex ante whether they can or 
want to set up a company, an exchange contract (of what type?) or whether 
someone is just doing a favour for a friend.
The methods adopted by the law of the “society of networks” now 
being constituted are still in a state of flux. In my opinion, the new difficulties 
encountered when developing a constitution for the “society of networks” are 
related to the fact that the networks develop to a considerable extent beyond 
the mediation of the state’s legal system. One far from negligible effect of 
this is that the development of suitable institutions is also at least partly 
blocked. Networks can be characterised negatively first by the fact that they 
circumvent the classical distinctions between inside and outside, between 
market and organisation, and between public and private (Teubner 2011). In 
particular, the dynamic of disruptive technologies leads to the development 
of “epistemic communities”, where knowledge is generated and processed. 
It is accompanied by volatile institutions of self-organisation, because the 
state law is not well-tuned to observing and shaping networks. In this respect, 
Gunther Teubner’s analysis (2012) of the “self-constitutionalisation” of inter-
organisational co-operation etc., is exemplary.
The unlimited way in which networks proceed corresponds to the rise 
of the concept of governance (Schuppert 2011), which indicates that the 
state and the law can rely less and less on “decisions” as means of binding 
and dealing with uncertainty. On the other hand, the institutionalisation of 
networks also calls for new forms of reconciliation with state law, whose 
relatively stable institutions need to be adapted to an experimental mode 
of observing development trajectories ex post, given that they are confused 
by the introduction of multiple possibilities (replacing guidance) and the 
increase of intransparency. However, only a few comments can be made 
about this here.
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It could be said that not only is the law further fragmented by the 
constraint to adjust to new heterarchical networks, but that the function of 
law itself is also fragmented: the law becomes more markedly experimental 
in character as it makes individual partial functions available, which may 
structure private and private-public procedures of standardisation, for 
example, but may also come unstuck in the process. This applies in public 
international law, for example, to the development of emerging legal reforms 
beyond the boundaries of the state and this side of classical international law 
(responsibility to protect, global administrative law; cf. Brunnée & Toope 2000: 
19; Ku 20012: 13), or to the preparation of the ability to develop contracts 
in complex operative networks without any clear purpose (Jennejohn 2010: 
173)12. This includes new forms of mediation and conflict resolution, which 
also lead to the development of new law. These forms combine when, 
for example, new networks of evaluation (such as eBay) have to be taken 
into consideration. Collective side-effects on the whole system cannot be 
neglected in judgments about the limits of the freedom of opinion of users. 
This calls for new forms of monitoring and evaluation that open the law up 
systematically to a learning process. As a result, facticity and normativity 
are blurred in a new way. Juridification is called into play explicitly as a 
way of regulating private and private-public networks. This happens, for 
example, if specialised lawyers who are acquainted with the complexity of 
computer networks are engaged more as specialists for the determination 
of what the reasonable interpretation of an opaque legal relationship might 
suggest. And more often than not such interpretations are accepted by the 
participants because they know that relational “net subjects” have to adopt 
a flexible strategy for the cooperation in conditions of uncertainty. Neither 
legal normative patterns of contractual coordination nor individual contracts 
can provide satisfactory a satisfactory legal framework for the coordination 
of unclear perspectives on a dynamic project. In the past, legal forms in 
the past have presupposed the possibility of formulating more or less stable 
patterns of expectations and a correspondence with patterned forms of legal 
coordination of such expectations. However, in conditions of uncertainty, 
this is no longer the case. There is until now no law that is made for “surfing 
fluid reality” (Bahrami/Evans 2011). In many cases this type of flexible law 
can only emerge in “real time” or even ex post – if, for example, Microsoft 
offers much money for the software that has been conceived by a group of 
12 The law only becomes ex post when, for example, an unstructured hi-tech co-operation network (such as 
Silicon Valley) is “translated” into a legal form, after the network’s product has suddenly achieved a high 
market value: this is when the need arises to clarify what kind of legal relationship has actually come into 
being. The availability of fictions makes the law thoroughly suitable for this purpose.
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loosely co-operating young people who did not think about such a prospect. 
One might call the patterns that emerge ex post from such a practice of 
co-operation “serial law”, because of the preponderance of a “series” of 
practical “moves” in fluid reality.
It does not appear to make much sense to derive more extensive 
materials or formal demands of the law of networks from the principle of 
democracy if the state and administration are incapable of taking expertise 
into account. In would instead make more sense to integrate the demands on 
law-making formulated ex ante by mobilising the instrument of subsequent 
improvement, with whose assistance the suitability of decision-making 
procedures could be evaluated ex post (Ladeur 2012: 369).
THE LIMITS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS
As the flipside of this change, the change in the individuality of the 
“society of networks” must also be taken into consideration from a legal 
perspective. How can a cognitive, epistemic link be maintained in a society 
whose institutions are so volatile and fragmented? This calls for a new 
collective model of “order far from equilibrium” (Prigogine & Stengers 1990; 
Nicolis & Prigogine 1987: 77; Atlan 1979) that is also compatible with the 
law. In my opinion, its shortcomings are reflected not only in the field of 
data protection and the Internet, but also in the conflict about religion in the 
public realm (of school) and generally in the rise of a “nomadically-inclined 
individualism”, which rejects the influence of communications via third 
parties as illegitimate “interference” and thus hinders every process of the 
construction of stable institutions that would correspond to the law of the 
past. This is also the reason why more and more quasi-judicial adjudication 
by courts of arbitration or arbiters replaces state-based court practice: there 
is no stability in a factual nor in a normative sense. Arbitration and its frame 
of reference have themselves to generate legal solutions upon the basis of 
specific experience or expertise and not from general norms or patterns of 
the practice. In this respect the emergence of a “web” of judgments that can 
give orientation to practitioners cannot easily be imagined. This extreme 
complexity of factual and normative issues casts some doubt on the idea of 
an international court for the decision on conflicts about the “application” 
of transnational treaties on investment protection: Such a court would not 
be really democratically legitimated because it would no longer have a clear 
institutional integration into a state or an international organisation. It would 
itself be rather free floating. The problems of the emerging network society 
lie much deeper. They call into question the whole logic of the state and 
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stable legal patterns of coordination. The law of the network society has to 
cope with a much more fundamental transformation of the whole structure 
of law.
Inside these networks, it is possible to discern signs of the development 
of a new relational person, who takes part in a variety of networks, for 
example, on the Internet, relating together the interests of a variety of 
“societies of mind” (Marvin Minsky) with one another, corresponding to the 
“society of the mind” that the cognitive sciences have observed at work in 
the human brain.
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